This article is concerned with state-sponsored electoral violence in liberalised autocracies. The first section of the paper identifies a number of variables that can help explain the decision calculus of authoritarian incumbents to deploy force against strong electoral challengers. The second section then examines these propositions with reference to Egypt and Morocco. Drawing on recent parliamentary elections in both countries the article questions why, despite facing the challenge of political Islam, the two regimes differed so markedly in their willingness to manipulate the polls by recourse to violence. Whilst the Egyptian authorities decided to abrogate all pretence of peaceful elections in favour of violent repression against the Muslim Brotherhood candidates and sympathisers, no such tactics were deployed by the ruling elite in Morocco. We suggest that three principal factors influenced the regimes' response to this electoral challenge: (1) the centrality of the elected institution to authoritarian survival, (2) the availability of alternative electioneering tools and (3) the anticipated response of the international community. The article concludes by suggesting that in order to understand better when and how states deploy violence in elections, we need to focus on a more complex set of factors rather than simply on the electoral potency of key opposition challengers or the authoritarian nature of the state.
Introduction
The phenomenon of violence in elections is one of many paradoxes with which political scientists have to grapple. Whilst theoretically the notions of elections and violence seem incompatible, in practice they often go hand in hand. Multiparty elections epitomise efforts at managing political conflict by non-violent means, and are commonly regarded as the ultimate remedy for conflict in society. Yet reality is often multifaceted, with outbursts of violence accompanying elections at various stages of the process, either in the lead-up to, during or in the aftermath of polling day.
The phenomenon itself is as old as the electoral principle. It was as much a feature of elections in ancient Rome, the Victorian era and nineteenth century America, as it sadly remains in modern times. 1 Acts of violence causing death and destruction have in the past marred elections in countries across continents and different political systems, and continue to do so. And yet the phenomenon has evoked limited scholarly interest. As Rapoport and Weinberg remark, despite a plethora of research on political violence, there is a paucity of comparative studies on its 'little brother', electoral violence. 2 The only analyses at hand are those by Rapoport and Weinberg themselves and a number of studies addressing the issue of electoral violence in conflict and transitional settings. 3 Even less is available when it comes to the phenomenon of state-sponsored electoral violence. A few case studies apart, no academic work exists which broadly explores the question of when and why states resort to coercion in elections. 4 In keeping with the theme of the special issue, this article examines the third area of research spelled out by Schwarzmantel in his introductory contribution:
'violence as a challenge to democracy'. According to Schwarzmantel this challenge carries two dimensions. As far as liberal democracies are concerned the challenge of violent politics emanates primarily from social movements seeking better inclusion and recognition within the polity, whilst in non-democracies or in liberalising countries where uncertainty over the process is high it is often the regime itself which resorts to violence as a means of securing authoritarian survival.
Focusing on the later scenario, this article explores state sponsorship of political violence in elections with a specific focus on the Arab world where we can observe, paradoxically, both the persistence of authoritarianism and a significant increase in electoral contests. The article puts forward a number of variables that can help explain why and when authoritarian incumbents deploy violent electioneering tactics as a means of 'carving the democratic heart out of the electoral contest'. 5 Essentially, we suggest that one ought to look beyond the nature of authoritarianism and the electoral potency of opposition challengers to understand the conditions under which states are likely to resort to such tactics. Three factors are identified that may explain state sponsorship of electoral violence. First, we focus on the institutional framework in a given country and consider the centrality and effective policy-making powers of the elected institutions for authoritarian elites. How important is the institution for which elections are held? Second, we explore the availability of alternative electioneering devices falling short of the resort to force, and how the regime employs such alternatives to manage the election process. Finally, we emphasise that domestic decision-making takes into account the anticipated response of the international community to the use of electoral fraud in general and of electoral violence in particular.
This theoretical framework is then examined in the context of recent parliamentary elections in Egypt (2005) and Morocco (2007) . The two cases lend themselves to an exploratory analysis of state-sponsored election violence for a number of reasons. To begin with, they are both authoritarian countries with a liberalising agenda and can be defined as 'liberalised autocracies.' 6 Second, they are representative of the political dynamics in many countries across the Arab world where existing regimes are somehow able to survive despite the lack of popular legitimacy and the presence of a strong Islamist opposition. Third, the two countries, like many others in the region, have increasingly taken elections seriously over the last decade because of both domestic and international pressures for reform. Finally, the two countries are paradigmatic of the two types of regime we find in the region.
Morocco represents the political and institutional dynamics that we find in Arab monarchies where rulers are unelected and where legitimacy can be characterised as 'traditional.' Egypt exemplifies the manner in which politics takes place in authoritarian republics where 'strong' presidents are elected and have to deal with specific electoral constraints. This allows for an examination of how electoral contests occur in the two countries and how authoritarian incumbents respond to strong challengers at the ballot box.
Electoral potency, threat perceptions and state-sponsored violence in authoritarian elections
This article adopts a simplified decision-theoretic approach to the study of statesponsored violence in authoritarian elections. It assumes that authoritarian incumbents are rational actors whose principal objective is to remain in power and whose decision to resort to, tolerate or refrain from violence against political opponents is a strategic choice amongst many to ensure regime survival. State-sponsored violence is thus neither irrational nor indiscriminate, but constitutes a course of action that is deliberate and usually targeted at opposition forces perceived as posing a most serious threat to authoritarian incumbency.
We define electoral violence as acts or threats of coercion, intimidation or physical harm perpetrated to affect the process and/or outcome of an election. The instigators of such violence can include both state actors (police, secret services, armed forces) and non-state actors (e.g. political parties and guerrilla, rebel or paramilitary groups). Where the former is involved we are dealing with so-called state-sponsored electoral violence. This is a form of political violence instigated either directly by the state authorities or by regime proxies, such as militias, ruling parties, regime-hired troublemakers, and so forth. Following Gartner and Regan 7 we have included regime proxies in our definition of state-sponsored violence based on the assumption that the central authorities hold significant sway over these agents and their actions.
With few exceptions, it appears that most instances of state-sponsored electoral violence occur in non-democratic regimes. 8 Illustrative cases in point are the coercive tactics recently employed by authoritarian incumbents in elections in Zimbabwe (2008) and Ethiopia (2000) . 9 For these regimes, as for any electoral autocracy, authoritarian survival in a liberalised environment is of paramount concern, and resorting to violence in elections constitutes one of several illegitimate strategies to secure this survival at the ballot box. Alongside ballot fraud and vote buying, brute force, or the failure to prevent it, is often used by the authorities and/or their proxies to distort the electoral competition in favour of regime-supportive forces and to quell any post-election outburst of popular anger at the rigging of the election result, as happened for instance in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential poll in Iran. Acts of regime-perpetrated electoral violence can take various forms, ranging from targeted killings of prominent opposition figures, the physical disruption of opposition rallies, the beating and/or arbitrary arrest of opposition candidates and sympathisers, to coercive measures aimed at preventing voters from casting their ballots.
When deployed by authoritarian incumbents, the overall objectives and targets of state-sponsored violence in elections are thus relatively easy to discern. Usually the overriding aim is to neutralise key electoral challengers and the targets of such violence are those opposition forces perceived as posing the greatest threat to the electoral status quo. What is more difficult to determine however, and of interest here, is the decision-calculus that drives authoritarian elites to use force as an electioneering tool in the first place, particularly as it is the regime itself that has decided on holding multiparty elections. Is it possible to predict a state's propensity to resort to violence in elections? If so, when and how do authoritarian incumbents determine that the benefits of deploying force outweigh both the loss of domestic legitimacy that invariably goes hand in hand with this repressive strategy, and the possible ire of the international community?
For authoritarian rulers the very notion of opposition is suspect and treated as a potential or real threat to regime survival. Obviously, the degree to which autocrats tolerate political opposition is contingent on the nature of authoritarianism (closed vs.
competitive autocracies) and the types of demands articulated by their opponents. 10 Pliant and weak opposition parties, for instance, which are allowed to garner a limited number of seats in parliament in return for their aquiescence in the existing order, pose no serious electoral challenge to incumbent regimes and are thus essentially nonthreatening. In fact, some scholars have argued that, where allowed to operate, these opposition forces help sustain a veneer of democratic governance within inherently autocratic structures and as such prolong rather than endanger regime survival.
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The situation may change dramatically, however, wherever the electoral potency of the opposition is enhanced, that is where non-regime forces show any real sign of grassroots support, organisational capacity, and/or willingness to challenge the boundaries of acceptable dissent. In these circumstances then, authoritarian incumbents are faced with real challengers at the ballot box.
At first glance it therefore appears that electoral potency features critically in the decision-calculus of autocrats to use force against challengers in elections. And indeed, with the electoral equilibrium under threat, authoritarian governments may be tempted to deploy repressive means to sustain the electoral status quo. Yet electoral potency on its own cannot explain the choice of violence. One could, for instance, conceive of a strong opposition being allowed to do well in elections simply because the institution for which parties are competing is constitutionally relatively powerless.
Equally, one could think of the role that political parties actually play in any political system, contrasting regimes reliant on a ruling party to ones based on unelected decision-makers such as monarchs. These regimes may inevitably view electoral competition and its challenges very differently and thus diverge in their readiness to resort to force during an election.
It is thus apparent that other important factors must be considered in order to fully understand the decision-making rationale of authoritarian incumbents in resorting to violence in elections. As mentioned earlier, we propose three variables that may help explain when electoral potency turns into an electoral threat which from the regime's point of view warrants violent repression. The first variable to examine is the centrality for authoritarian survival of the institution for which parties and candidates are competing. Authoritarian rulers have to identify the importance of the institution and decide whether losing power within it would undermine significantly their legitimacy and ability to rule unhindered. It becomes therefore important to determine where the particular institution is located in terms of its constitutional relevance. Accordingly, in a political system where the executive and legislative powers are elected and mutually interdependent, the stakes of electoral competition are quite high because the authoritarian incumbent could conceivably have much to lose if a strong opposition were to take advantage of even limited openings. This has been the case for instance in Algeria in 1990 when the Islamic Salvation Front (known by its French acronym FIS) won the legislative elections. The number of seats it won would have given the party the possibility to change the constitution. The Algerian parliament was therefore a very significant institution and its 'loss' to the Islamists was countered with significant violence. Conversely, in the context of a political system where the main executive institution is beyond electoral politics, as in executive monarchies, electoral competition for the legislature might not constitute a significant challenge to the authoritarian incumbent because formal legitimacy derives from other sources. Thus, a monarch might be more willing and even encourage effective pluralism. 12 The Jordanian elections reflect this logic, as supreme executive powers are in the hands of the monarch who uses parties in parliament to selectively support his policies.
The second factor to examine concerns the nature of the electoral contest itself and the tools available to incumbents to influence its outcome. Elections in authoritarian systems have the overarching objective of fostering regime legitimacy, but they can be either threatening or legitimising. 13 Threatening elections mean that authoritarian incumbents have been forced to open up the political system defensively due to either domestic or external pressures or both, and the electoral competition becomes therefore a potentially dangerous test of popularity. The ruling elite in this case is very aware of the potentially snowballing effects of such elections if they do not deliver results that make survival possible, and is willing to influence the outcome with all the means at his disposal, including violence. On the contrary, legitimising elections serve the purpose of demonstrating the existence of political pluralism, and whilst incumbents also attempt to control the results, such results do not have the same significance. First the regime's legitimacy rests elsewhere and, second, it is precisely by allowing a degree of effective pluralism that incumbents derive both domestic and international benefits. In this case the instrument of violence would be damaging to the survival of the regime because it would indicate that the other tools to remain in power are no longer effective.
The third and final factor has to do with the international response which authoritarian elites must anticipate when deploying force against political opponents.
For authoritarian regimes the recourse to violence as an electioneering tool not only carries domestic risks, but can also incur significant external costs. These costs can range from moral condemnation to the withdrawal of vital economic and military aid, the suspension of bilateral/multilateral trade agreements or the imposition of economic and/or political sanctions. 14 No liberalising regime that breaches the norms of electoral good governance is likely to escape some form of international condemnation. In the past, Western governments have on numerous occasions issued statements reminding the regimes in question of their commitment to free and fair elections. The real issue, therefore, is not so much whether offending regimes will be reprimanded, but whether key Western allies are prepared to impose negative sanctions in order to pressure authoritarian incumbents to improve their rights record in elections. Two factors may play into the decision of whether and when Western governments are prepared to do so. First, it may depend on whether or not regime repression is perceived as a democratisation-threatening or a democratisation-saving exercise. If it is the latter, then some form of repression against political opponents, including the use of force, may be tolerated and would not damage the overall democratising legitimacy of authoritarian incumbents. Second, Western governments may also shy away from deploying negative sanctions against regimes considered 'pivotal states' in a geostrategic sense. 15 Here again, authoritarian stability and the survival of a pro-Western government may outweigh any concern for democratic reforms, particularly if such reforms would benefit forces perceived as inherently anti-Western. In both scenarios then, the external costs of violent repression are likely to be short-term and limited, and unlikely to damage the rulers' overall credentials as democratising regimes or their strategic partnership with the West.
Regime violence in Egypt's 2005 parliamentary elections
Egypt last went to the polls in autumn 2005 to elect a new president and lower house of parliament. The months leading to the polls were marked by an air of measured optimism that the voting experience would be qualitatively different from past elections. Whilst no-one assumed that Mubarak would lose the presidency or the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) its stranglehold over the legislature, developments in and outside the country nonetheless suggested that this time around there would be no 'election-business as usual'. Confronted with an emboldened reform movement at home and a US administration eager to see Egypt take a lead in regional democratisation efforts, the regime found itself under unprecedented pressure to organise clean and peaceful elections. 16 At first, this pressure appeared to be having the desired effect. In February 2005 Mubarak unexpectedly announced a reform of the presidential election law, opening the presidency to multi-candidate contestation. The elections themselves, which took place on September 7 th , were hailed by the international community as a significant step towards democracy and seen as evidence that Mubarak was committed to cleaner elections. Observers lauded the calm and overall openness that prevailed throughout the campaigning period and on polling day itself, and commented positively on the fact that opposition candidates were allowed to campaign relatively unhindered. 17 Little over a month later, the parliamentary election campaign seemed to kickoff to a similarly encouraging start. Yet again the regime appeared more relaxed about opposition activism than in the past, granting it an exceptional margin of freedom during the campaigning period. Even the Muslim Brotherhood, long vilified by the government, enjoyed unprecedented freedom during the campaign, with the group's candidates and cadres being allowed to canvass their message relatively openly and without the usual government interference and intimidation. 18 It thus appeared that the upcoming poll would run peacefully and that the new legislature would be more pluralist than its predecessors.
This was not to be, however. Far from passing peacefully, Egypt bore witness to an election that was marred by the most serious outbreak of political violence since the 1995 parliamentary poll. By the time the polling stations closed on 9 December 2005, the elections had cost 11 lives and left over 500 people wounded in scores of violent clashes. 19 According to observers on the ground, most of the violence took place in rounds two and three of the voting and involved in a vast majority of instances the Egyptian security forces and NDP-hired trouble-makers on the one side and Brotherhood candidates and their supporters on the other. What is so remarkable about these elections and in need of explanation, however, is the fact that the violence broke out so late in the election process and that it stood in sharp contrast to the relative quiet and openness that had prevailed during the campaigning period. As far as state involvement is concerned, we posit that the use of force by the security services and NDP trouble-makers was calculated and targeted against the opposition group posing the gravest electoral threat to ruling party candidates. For the regime this threat emanated from the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) which, by virtue of its exceptionally strong showing at the ballot box, endangered the NDP's stranglehold over the legislature, which thus constituted such a key pillar of authoritarian survival.
Another important factor was that from the regime's point of view the use of force against the MB was deemed both necessary and viable. It seemed necessary because so late in the election process the regime had run out of alternatives to turn the situation around and manufacture an NDP landslide. It was considered viable, because in this particular instance Cairo's domestic threat perceptions coincided with American security concerns over rising 'Islamist extremism' in the region, which meant that Egypt was unlikely to come under fire from Washington over the deployment of repressive force against the Brotherhood and its sympathisers.
It is widely recognised that the Muslim Brotherhood constitutes by far the most potent political threat to the regime. 22 For Mubarak the MB has long lost its utility as a bulwark against leftist forces, and is nowadays regarded as a serious menace to the regime. Not only is the group greater than other opposition parties in its resource capacity (both human and financial), organisational reach and ability to muster grass-roots support, but also in the assertiveness with which it challenges the secular foundations of the Egyptian regime and its pro-Western foreign policy. 23 Tethering perilously close to the red-lines of 'acceptable opposition behaviour', the Muslim Brotherhood is thus susceptible to regime repression.
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Whilst a total crackdown on the group has never been on the cards -primarily because this would drive the Islamists underground and cut off millions of Egyptian citizens from vital social services provided by the group -the authorities have always made it clear that serious MB forays into national politics would not be tolerated. The regime remains fiercely opposed to the notion of a legalised Muslim Brotherhood party and, although in past elections it did allow MB members to stand as independents, it has taken great care to contain their electoral potency. 25 In the legislative elections of 1995 and 2000, for instance, the group was subjected to a systematic and unrelenting clampdown on its candidates and supporters. As a consequence of this and other forms of regime-perpetuated electoral malpractice, the group has had little success in translating its support on the Egyptian street into a meaningful presence in parliament. In 1995 the MB won just one and in 2000 seventeen of the 444 elective assembly seats.
end of which the group had captured 34 of the 164 available seats.
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For the MB this was a remarkable success, given that 67 percent of its candidates had won their electoral contests and that so early on in the polling process the group had already doubled the number of its representatives in the Egyptian legislature.
The regime meanwhile must have read these first-round results with some alarm. Not only had the NDP fared relatively poorly, capturing 'just' 112 of all available seats, 28 but there was a real danger that similar Brotherhood inroads in the rounds to come would cost the ruling party its two-thirds majority in parliament. As will be discussed below, this considerable majority has been critical to the survival of the Mubarak regime ever since the turn to multiparty politics. 
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Discounting the damage this sudden outburst of violence has done to the reform credentials of the Egyptian regime, it appears to have aided the NDP in securing the 303 mandates needed to retain its two-thirds majority in parliament. the political executive, the regime relies on the NDP and its capacity to win two-thirds majorities at the ballot box. With this majority secured, Mubarak was able in the past to control the plenary debates and committee work in parliament and ensure that the opposition lacks the numerical strength to obstruct the passage of critical government legislation or to push through liberalising reforms, censor cabinet ministers or impeach the president. 31 Crucially also, over the past three decades it has allowed
Mubarak to govern by emergency rule, which must be granted and periodically renewed by the lower house of parliament with a two-thirds majority.
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Whilst the constitutional powers of the presidency are vast, these emergency provisions have endowed Mubarak with important additional tools to regulate and control political life without appearing illegal. Emergency powers allow the president to govern by decree, suspend basic civil liberties, censor the press and detain regime critics without trial, all for the 'good' of safeguarding national security and public order. 33 In actual practice, of course, the regime has deployed most of these powers to tackle domestic opponents, including most prominently the Muslim Brotherhood. 34 Critical to authoritarian survival, the capacity to govern by emergency rule was thus to be defended at all costs, if needed by resort to illegitimate vote-gaining strategies.
As for the question of why the regime resorted to violence, the decision must be interpreted as a measure of last resort, conditioned by the absence of viable alternatives to manufacture desired election outcomes so late in the voting process and the minimal external costs this repressive strategy appeared to inflict on the Mubarak administration. As far as the former is concerned, it is likely that the unavailability of Whilst it should be kept in mind that the PJD is generally considered not to be antagonistic to the Monarchy, a very high electoral score might have emboldened those within the party who would be eager to display a much more forceful opposition to the current policies. In any case, it should be underlined that since its entry into electoral politics, the PJD has never joined governing coalitions, maintaining therefore a degree of distance from both the monarchy and the other political parties.
On a superficial level, the same domestic and international constraints that applied to the Egyptian case were also present in Morocco. The international community expected the elections to demonstrate that external support for the Monarchy was well founded because King Mohammed VI was indeed moving the country towards democracy. Domestically, the elections were lauded as the culmination of a process of socio-political change that had seen the King push for a progressive liberal reform of the family code, the expansion of a range of civil liberties and the creation of a reconciliation commission to investigate past human rights abuses. 42 The Kingdom would finally move towards substantial political reforms, the missing element so far in Mohammed VI's liberalising agenda.
The strategy of including Islamist groups into the political and institutional game had been a 'risk' that King Mohammed VI's predecessor, Hassan II, had been willing to undertake in order to avoid the 'Algerian scenario', and he proceeded to include the PJD in the parliamentary scene. Mohammed VI continued his father's policy towards the PJD and the party ran in a limited number of constituencies in
2002 showing considerable strength. 43 In 2007 the PJD was allowed to run in all constituencies and it was tipped as the inevitable frontrunner. Indeed, most observers and the leaders of the other parties expected it to win a clear plurality of both votes and seats, and members of the PJD itself were confident of topping the polls, claiming that they were 'able to obtain 70 seats.' This is even more the case precisely because an Islamist party was allowed to run, strengthening the impression of genuine political change. Without this reputation, Morocco would not be able to extract as many benefits from the international community. Some would argue that appearing to be a 'democratizer' is not an important pre-condition for having good relations with the West and this is generally true, as the cases of neighbouring Tunisia and Algeria demonstrate. However, it is important to look at where each country stands in terms of international reputation.
Morocco always thrived on presenting itself as a pluralist society with a multiparty system and obviously deviating from that would detract from its reputation. Tunisia and Algeria had a very different type of image abroad and therefore probably enjoyed more latitude when it comes to their reputation as democratizers. In conclusion, the absence of violence and of interference in the electoral process do not constitute signs of democratisation, but simply indicate that the manipulation strategy of the regime sees elections as central elements of international legitimacy and they should therefore be conducted with high standards. The 2007 elections were certainly an improvement on previous contests when vote-buying and fraud occurred on a massive scale and when some parties, as was the case for the PJD in 2002, were only partially able to compete freely. However, this does not substantially modify the decision-making balance in the political system, which is heavily tilted towards the monarchy. In this context, it is therefore obvious that violence from both state authorities and from autonomous political groups would be extremely damaging for the image of Morocco and for its self-perception. On the one hand, the monarch and the security apparatus refrain from using violent coercion and, increasingly, from practices such as ballot box stuffing because this would send the signal that the country is no longer on the road to democracy. On the other hand, widespread electoral violence on the part of political movements would indicate not only that the state is not in control, but, more crucially, that there is strong opposition to elections per se, once again presenting an image of instability that the monarchy is very keen to avoid.
Conclusion
Far from being antithetical, elections and violence are often intertwined. This is particularly the case, as one would expect, in conflict-ridden societies and liberalising countries. It is increasingly, however, a phenomenon that is also encountered in fullyfledged authoritarian regimes. Whilst there is a significant amount of scholarship dealing with the question of why authoritarian leaders even bother holding elections in the first place, this article attempts to explain under which conditions rulers employ violence once the electoral process has begun. Whilst the electoral potency of the opposition is certainly an important element in the rational calculus that rulers make when deciding to employ or refrain from the use of force in elections, there are other factors that need to be taken into account. It is necessary first of all to analyse the relative importance of the institution for which elections are called for. Second, there is the need to examine the alternatives that a regime has in order to influence the outcome of elections. Finally, in an increasingly interdependent world, one has to take into account the reactions of the international community. 
